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The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and Class
Action Waivers after A T& T v. Concepcion
I. INTRODUCTION

A man may not barter away his life or his freedom, or
his substantial rights . . .. In a civil case . . . any citizen

may no doubt waive the rights to which he may be
entitled. He cannot, however, bind himself in advance
by an agreement, which may be specifically enforced,
thus to forfeit his rights at all times and on all occasions,
whenever the case may be presented.'
While some view arbitration as an adequate forum for the
vindication of rights, others argue that social and "public policy
concerns provide a reason to withhold certain claims from the
arbitration system." 2 In particular, both scholars and legislators suggest
that all mandatory arbitration agreements between consumers and
businesses are "unjust" because of the unequal bargaining power
present in these agreements. 3 In a 5-to-4 decision, however, in April of
2011 the United States Supreme Court made it easier for businesses to
require consumers to sign binding pre-dispute arbitration agreements
that prohibit them from joining class actions.4 Yet it may be the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) that has the last word.
The CFPB was created in Title X of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank)

1. Ins. Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445, 451 (1874).
2. See Genevieve Hanfit, Giving Arbitration Some Credit: The Enforceability of
Arbitration Clauses Under the Credit Repair Act, 79 FORDHAM L. REv. 2761, 2779-85
(2011) (discussing the evolution of Arbitration Jurisprudence).
3. See Kate Davidson, Supreme Court Gives Banks a Win on Arbitration, But Will
CFPB Trump It?, FrN. PLAN., 2011 WLNR 8241900 (Apr. 28, 2011) (noting that mandatory
arbitration has been a top consumer complaint for years); Hanft, supra note 2, at 2801
(noting that supporters of this view point contend that arbitration was intended to be used
only by businesses with unequal bargaining power).
4. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1750 (2011) (permitting
contractual exclusion of class action arbitration).
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and assumed its powers as an independent bureau within the Federal
Reserve System on July 21, 2011.5 While the CFPB's authority may
not be construed to prohibit or restrict a consumer from entering into a
voluntary arbitration agreement with a business after a dispute has
arisen, Dodd-Frank requires the CFPB to conduct a study and prepare a
report to Congress concerning the use of mandatory pre-dispute
arbitration agreements in connection with consumer financial products
or services. 6 If consistent with the study, Dodd-Frank further permits
the CFPB to restrict or prohibit these mandatory pre-dispute arbitration
agreements in the future.7 This Note evaluates the Supreme Court
ruling in AT&T v. Concepcion and discusses the potential role of the
CFPB in regulating class action waivers in mandatory pre-dispute
arbitration agreements.
The CFPB aims to "make markets for consumer financial
products and services work for Americans."8 Under Dodd-Frank, the
CFPB is charged with "facilitating the collection and monitoring of and
response to consumer complaints regarding certain financial products
and services." 9 One challenge of the CFPB will be carving out abuses
within the financial system, without over regulating to the point where
consumer access to financial services becomes too limited.'o In
addition to exploring the role of the CFPB in wake of AT&T v.
Concepcion, this Note will examine the impact of class action waivers
on the rights of businesses and consumers. This Note contends that
class actions, while providing only a limited benefit to the individual
consumer, may serve as a socially productive deterrent to consumer
abuses by businesses. Therefore, this Note further offers suggestions on
how the CFPB should develop substantive regulations to protect
consumer interests without having too heavy a hand.
5. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1011, 12 U.S.C. §
5491 (Supp. IV 2010).
6. Id.; see also Davidson, supra note 3 ("[T]he Dodd-Frank Act requires the CFPB to
study and provide a report to [C]ongress concerning the use of mandatory arbitration
agreements in connection with consumer financial products.").
7. 12 U.S.C. § 5491; see also Davidson, supra note 3 (discussing the duties given to
the CFPB under Dodd-Frank).
8. Building the CFPB, CONSUMER FrNANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, 18 (July 18,
2011), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/Report Building
TheCfpbl.pdf.
9. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 5493, 5534; Building the CFPB, supra note 8, at 5.
10. See Davidson, supra note 3 (arguing that the CFPB should balance the concerns of
both businesses and consumers).
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Part II will give a short overview of federal arbitration law, the
mandatory arbitration debate, and class action waivers. Part III will
dissect the Supreme Court decision in AT&T v. Concepcion and predict
the future application of the ruling. Part IV will discuss the potential
role of the CFPB in the wake of Concepcion.
II. FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW AND THE MANDATORY ARBITRATION
DEBATE

A.

FederalArbitrationLaw

Arbitration is a form of dispute resolution whereby parties agree
among themselves to hire a private judge to adjudicate their dispute."
Though arbitration began as a tool for resolving disputes between
merchants, today arbitration is also commonly used in disputes between
businesses and consumers. 12 In general, state contract law governs the
13
process of forming contracts, including arbitration contracts.
However, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the Federal
Arbitration Act preempts any state law that may be inconsistent with the
Act's provision or purposes. 14
In 1925, Congress passed the United States Arbitration Act that
made written agreements for arbitration of disputes arising out of
contracts, maritime transactions, or interstate commerce valid and
enforceable. 15 This statute was reenacted and codified in 1947 as the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) amidst some resistance about the
benefits of using arbitration in a wide-range of disputes.' 6 Under the
FAA, arbitration agreements may be enforced in two ways: (1) federal

11.

CHRISTOPHER R. DRAHOZAL, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: CASES AND PROBLEMS I

(2d ed. 2006).
12. Id.
13. See id. ("Arbitration is matter of contract between the parties.").
14. See Moses H. Cone Mem'1 Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)
(discussing the general federal policy of enforcing arbitration agreements); Southland Corp.
v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984) (holding that the FAA preempts inconsistent state
arbitration laws).
15. United States Arbitration Act, Pub. L. No. 401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as
amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (2006)).
16. Federal Arbitration Act, Pub. L. No. 282, 61 Stat. 669 (1947) (codified as amended
at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (2006)); see also Hanft, supra note 2, at 2779-80 ("While . . . this Act
was generally lauded in the legal community, some were hesitant about the benefits of using
arbitration in a broader array of disputes.").
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courts may issue a stay of proceedings if any suit is brought in court
upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for
such arbitration; 17 and (2) federal courts may compel arbitration in
accordance with the terms of the arbitration agreement upon being
satisfied that the legitimacy of the agreement to arbitrate is not an
issue.18 For example, provided that there was no defense to the
enforcement of the arbitration clause in a valid arbitration agreement,
parties that agree in writing to arbitrate disputes and waive their rights
to class action proceedings may be denied the right to participate in
class actions and compelled to arbitrate their disputes in accordance
with the terms of the agreement.1 9
MandatoryArbitration Debate

B.

1. The Development of Mandatory Arbitration Agreements
From when the FAA was enacted in 1925 to the 1970s and
1980s, the scope of Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce
increased dramatically which in turn increased the number of contracts
to which the FAA applied.20 In addition, arbitration clauses and
procedures, particularly between businesses and consumers, have
become more complex. 2 1 Consequently, both courts and legislatures
struggle over whether and how much to regulate contracts between
these parties.22 Part of the controversy stems from the fact that in the
United States, historically, consumers and businesses did not enter into
arbitration agreements with one another, and it is unlikely that Congress
considered such arbitrations in 1925 when it passed the United States
Arbitration Act.23
17. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2006).
18. Id. § 4.
19. Id. §§ 3-4.
20. See Christopher R. Drahozal, In Defense of Southland: Re-Examining the
Legislative History of the Federal Arbitration Act, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 101, 127-30
(2002).
21. See Christopher R. Drahozal & Peter B. Rutledge, Contract and Procedure, 94
MARQ. L. REv. 1103, 1164 (2011) [hereinafter Drahozal & Rutledge, Contract] (noting the
increased level of detail in arbitration agreements between businesses and consumers).
22.

DRAHOZAL, supra note 11, at 50.

23.

EDWARD BRUNET ET AL., ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT

127 (2006); United States Arbitration Act, Pub. L. No. 401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as
amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (2006)) (United States Arbitration Act was reenacted and
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The debate surrounding these types of arbitration agreements is
particularly heated in the context of mandatory arbitration.2 4 In
mandatory arbitration agreements, consumers are required to sign
standard form contracts containing pre-dispute arbitration clauses.25
The prevalence of such agreements increased after the Supreme Court's
decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp.26 In that decision,
the Court compelled arbitration of a claim under the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act (ADEA) 27 where the plaintiff signed an agreement
that contained a provision requiring arbitration of all future employment
related claims.28 In reaching its decision, the Court explained that
arbitration adequately protects statutory rights under the ADEA.29
2. The Advantages and Disadvantages of Mandatory Arbitration
For many reasons, applying a scheme of dispute resolution that
incorporates arbitration makes a lot of sense in business transactions. 30
codified in 1947 as the FAA).
24. See BRUNET ET AL., supra note 23, at 140 (stating that while critics feel comfortable
with the label mandatory arbitration, defenders suggests that this nomenclature is unfair
since consumers have the option to refuse services or products connected to binding
arbitration).
25. See id. at 143-44 (identifying reasons why mandatory arbitration can be unfair to
consumers).
26. See Angelito Remo Sevilla, The End of Duffield and the Rise of Mandatory
Arbitration: How Courts Misinterpreted the Civil Rights Act 's Arbitration Provision, 93
CALIF. L. REV. 323, 330-31 (2005) (suggesting that Gilmer triggered an exponential increase
in the use of arbitration agreements in the private sector). See generally Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (compelling arbitration of a claim under
ADEA).
27. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000)).
28. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26.
29. See id at 28 (stating that statute serves its "remedial and deterrent functions"
provided litigants are able to assert their statutory claims in arbitration); Sevilla, supra note
26, at 332-33 (noting the increased acceptance of alternative dispute resolutions in both the
public and private sectors).
30. See Michael A. Satz, Mandatory Binding Arbitration: Our Legal History Demands
Balanced Reform, 44 IDAHo L. REv. 19, 25-26 (2007) ("Business actors are seen as being
more sophisticated, repeat players in the conduct of their affairs, or at the very least, they are
seen as having access to more sophisticated resources in the form of lawyers and advisors.
This sophisticated, business-to-business, repeat player model is a critical component for the
theoretical argument in favor of arbitration in general: the actors in a typical business
transaction will know the business and industry norms; they will likely have an institutional
knowledge of the transaction and transaction-type at issue; they will have the resources to
effectively advocate their position in an arbitration; and they will be more likely to 'selfpolice' when, where, and how they press their claims because they deal with far fewer
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In general, arbitration is designed to reduce the costs and length of
judicial proceedings.31
As such, some contend that mandatory
arbitration is better for claimants than litigation. 32 The argument is that
"litigation is simply not affordable by or accessible to most consumers,
and therefore arbitration provides much better access." 33 For example,
arbitration typically has less discovery than litigation, which reduces the
time and cost of proceedings. 34 In addition to the lower costs and
relative speed of arbitration procedures, arbitration can also provide
parties with customized procedural rules and expertise in the decision
making process. 35 It is also likely that businesses' reduction in dispute
resolution costs results in savings for their customers that are realized in
the form of lower prices. 36 Defenders of mandatory arbitration thereby
contend that over-regulation of mandatory arbitration could lead to
higher prices for consumers of certain products and services.
However, critics suggest that mandatory arbitration agreements
erode the already limited bargaining power of the weaker party.38
Critics further assert that mandatory "arbitration agreements have taken
on a more coercive, non-negotiable, and less voluntary form." 39 For
example, businesses can require potential consumers to choose between
agreeing to the unilateral provisions of the contract and foregoing
desired products or services.40
Opponents also argue that these agreements are detrimental to
individual consumers and the public interest.41 For one, many
"consumers do not read or understand arbitration clauses. 4 2 Even
business actors than consumer actors.").
31. Meredith Goldich, Throwing Out the Threshold: Analyzing the Severability
Conundrum Under Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. V. Jackson, 60 AM. U.L. REv. 1673, 1679
(2011).
32. BRUNET ET AL., supra note 23, at 149.
33. Id.
34. See DRAHOZAL, supra note 11, at 28 (citing David B. Lipinsky & Ronald L.
Seeber, The Appropriate Resolution of Corporate Disputes: A Report on the Growing Use
of ADR by U.S. Corporations 17, 26 (1998)).
35. Goldich, supranote 31, at 1679.
36. See BRUNET ET AL., supranote 23, at 149.
37. See id
38. Sevilla, supra note 26, at 333.
39. Id. at 334.
40. See id. (discussing the disadvantages of mandatory arbitration agreements in
employment contracts).
41. BRUNET ET AL., supra note 23, at 143-47.
42. Id. at 143.
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consumers who read and understand these clauses may be unable to
properly recognize the advantages and disadvantages of accepting an
arbitration provision.43 Furthermore, many arbitration opinions are
unpublished and have limited reviewability." This private resolution
may prevent other consumers and members of the public from
benefitting from the public account that often occurs in litigation. 45 In
addition, the lack of judicial review combined with arbitrators'
malpractice immunity may deprive consumers of protection from
arbitrators' mistakes.46
3. General Overview of Class Actions
In recent years, businesses have taken to even "further
insulating themselves from liability by contractually restricting potential
plaintiffs' use of a powerful and legitimate procedural tool in
arbitration-the class action." 47 American Jurisprudence defines a class
action as "a nontraditional litigation procedure permitting a
representative with typical claims to sue or defend on behalf of, and
stand in judgment for, a class of similarly situated persons when a
question is one of common or general interest to persons so numerous
as to make it impracticable to bring them all before court."48 One goal
of class actions is to protect consumers through the deterrence of
business practices that affect large numbers of consumers but where
individual damage awards are too small to support a private lawsuit.49
In such cases, the class action may be deemed necessary to prevent the
"actor from retaining the benefits of its wrongful conduct simply
43.
44.

Id.
Goldich, supra note 31, at 1681.

45.

BRUNET ET AL., supra note 23, at 147-48.

46. Goldich, supra note 31, at 1681.
47. Bryon Allyn Rice, The Twelfth Annual Frankel Lecture: Comment: Enforceable or
Not?: Class Action Waivers in Mandatory Arbitration Clauses and the Need for a Judicial
Standard,45 Hous. L. REv. 215, 218 (2008).
48. 59 AM. JUR. 2D Parties§ 53 (2002) (citing Dupree v. Lafayette Ins. Co., 51 So. 3d
673 (La. 2010)).
49. See Stan Karas, The Role of Fluid Recovery in Consumer Protection Litigation:
Kraus v. Trinity Management Services, 90 CALIF. L. REv. 959, 965 (2002) (discussing how
class actions protect consumers); Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co., 2 P.3d 27, 31 (Cal. 2000)
(suggesting that deterrence should be considered by the courts when deciding whether to
certify a class);Vasquez v. Superior Court, 484 P.2d 964, 968 (Cal. 1971) ("A class action
by consumers produces several salutary by-products, including a therapeutic effect upon
those sellers who indulge in fraudulent practices . . . .").
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because no potential plaintiff would ever bring a lawsuit."5 0 Therefore,
the possibility of a recovery through a class action must factor into a
corporation's cost-benefit analysis of its conduct and practices with
respect to consumers.
However, some argue that class action lawsuits are nothing
more than "conglomerations of weak or nonexistent claims in an
attempt to 'win a potentially big payday' from ... a large
corporation." 52 Class actions also present numerous disadvantages for
the consumer including: (1) possible delay in obtaining individual relief;
(2) greater litigation expenses in the event of an unsuccessful class
action; and (3) an increased likelihood that the plaintiffs choice of
forum will not be upheld.
4. The Development of Class Action Waivers in Arbitration
Agreements
Since World War II, as businesses have become larger and class
action waivers have become more widely used in contracts of
adhesion,5 4 it has become more difficult for individuals "to stand up for
their rights in the face of corporate neglect or wrongdoing." 55 An
arbitration clause acts as a class action waiver because it prohibits
parties to the arbitration agreement from proceeding in court on a class
basis.
Corporations once primarily used the class action waiver to
insulate themselves from class actions in judicial proceedings, as class
wide arbitration procedures are a relatively recent development. After
50. See Karas, supra note 49, at 965 (discussing Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 433 P.2d
732, 746 (Cal. 1967), where a class action was allowed to proceed against a Los Angeles
taxicab company accused of systematically overcharging its customers).
51. Benjamin Sachs-Michaels, The Demise of Class Actions Will Not be Televised, 12
CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 665, 671 (2011).

52. Rice, supra note 47, at 223.
53. John F. Dienelt & Margaret E.K. Middleton, Settling FranchiseClass Actions, 21
FRANCHISE L.J. 113, 151 (2002).

54. See Edna Sussman, Comments to the Consumer FinancialProtection Bureau in
Connection with Its Review ofArbitrationfor Consumer FinancialProducts or Services, 12
CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 491, 501 (2011) (describing contracts of adhesion as standard

form agreements between businesses and consumers whose terms are not subject to
negotiation).
55. Sachs-Michaels, supra note 51, at 668-69.
56. Christopher R. Drahozal & Quentin R. Wittrock, Franchising,Arbitration,and the
Future of the Class Action, 3 ENTREPREN. Bus. L.J. 275, 281 (2009).
57. See Sussman, supra note 54, at 509-10 (noting that class actions in arbitration were
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the 2003 Supreme Court decision in Green Tree v. Bazzle, which was
read as "sanctioning class wide arbitration procedures, the American
Arbitration Association (AAA) began to administer demands for class
arbitration pursuant to its Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations if
(1) the underlying agreement specifies that disputes arising out of the
parties' agreement shall be resolved by arbitration in accordance with
any of the Association's rules, and (2) the agreement is silent with
respect to class claims, consolidation or joinder of claims."5 Since a
silent clause could then be seen as permitting class arbitration
proceedings, it is no surprise that businesses desiring to avoid class
wide arbitration, would seek to include a class action waiver provision
in their arbitration agreements.5 9 Yet in the 2010 Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v.
AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp. decision, the Supreme Court revisited the issue
of class wide arbitration, and held that class wide arbitration could only
proceed if the contract clearly indicated an agreement between the
parties to allow it. 60
Nonetheless, once it became clear that it was possible to have a
class action in arbitration, many corporations began adding separate
clauseS61 within the arbitration agreement expressly prohibiting the
aggregation of claims in a class action. 62 Therefore, "when an
arbitration clause and a class arbitration waiver are present together in
an arbitration agreement class relief may be altogether unavailable." 63
uncommon prior to the United States Supreme Court decision in Green Tree Fin. Corp. v.
Bazzle). See generally Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003).
58. See Sussman, supra note 54 (noting that the AAA put these rules into place
following the decision in Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle); AM. ARBITRATION Ass'N.,
(2003),
available at
FOR
CLASS
ARBITRATIONS
SUPPLEMENTARY
RULES
http://adr.org/sp.asp?id=21936. See generally Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444.
59. See William H. Baker, Class Action Arbitration, 10 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL.
335, 360 (2009) (suggesting that arbitration agreements should include a clause that
explicitly prohibits class actions in an arbitral forum in order to avoid class arbitration).
60. See Stolt-Nielsen S. A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1776 (2010)
("We think that the differences between bilateral and class-action arbitration are too great
for arbitrators to presume, consistent with their limited powers under the FAA, that the
parties' mere silence on the issue of class-action arbitration constitutes consent to resolve
their disputes in class proceedings.").
61. See Kaltwasser v. AT&T Mobility LLC, No. C 07-00411, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
106783 (D. Cal. Sep. 20, 2011) (providing an example of a class action waiver clause:
"YOU AND CINGULAR AGREE THAT EACH MAY BRING CLAIMS AGAINST THE
OTHER ONLY IN YOUR OR ITS INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY, AND NOT AS A
PURPORTED CLASS OR
PLAINTIFF OR CLASS MEMBER IN ANY
REPRESENTATIVE PROCEEDING.").
62. Sachs-Michaels, supra note 51, at 669.
63. Christopher R. Drahozal & Peter B. Rutledge, Arbitration and Consumer Credit8
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5. Class Action Waivers Pre-Concepcion
Since the development of class action waivers in mandatory
arbitration agreements, courts around the country have been split on
whether these waivers could be enforced.M The Supreme Court first
considered whether the FAA applied to state court proceedings in 1984
in Southland Corp. v. Keating.65 In Southland Corp., the Court held
that in enacting section 2 of the FAA, "Congress declared a national
policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of the states to
require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the
contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration." 66 However,
consistent with section 2 of the FAA,67 the Court noted that state
contract defenses such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability may still
be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements.6 8
For instance,
California courts have often found class action waivers unenforceable as
unconscionable or contrary to public policy. 69 Though some courts
deemed class actions or arbitrations as merely a procedural right,7 0 in
Discover Bank v. Superior Court, the California Supreme Court held
that the inclusion of class action waivers in mandatory consumer
arbitration agreements was unconscionable in cases where a party with
superior bargaining power was alleged to have "cheated a large number

(Univ. of Kan. Sch. Of Law, Working Paper No. 2011-3, 2011) [hereinafter Drahozal &
Rutledge, Arbitration& Consumer), availableat http://ssm.com/abstract-1880154.
64. Jessie K. Kamens & Tom P. Taylor, In 5-4 Decision, Supreme Court Vindicates
Use of Class Action Waivers in Arbitration, 96 BANKING REP. (BNA) No. 827, Apr. 28,
2011 (quoting Alan Kaplinsky, a partner at Ballard Spahr, L.L.P.).
65. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 3 (1984).
66. Id. at 10.
67. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 ("[A]n agreement in writing to submit to arbitration ... shall be
valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract.").
68. Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 16.
69. See Discover Bank v. Super. Ct., 36 Cal. 4th 148, 158 (Cal. 2005) (discussing
previous state opinions on the enforceability of class action waivers).
70. See, e.g., Strand v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 693 N.W.2d 918, 926 (ND 2005); Blaz
v. Belfer 368 F.3d 501, 504-505 (5th Cir. 2004); Johnson v. West Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d
366, 369 (3d Cir. 2000); Champ v. Siegel Trading Co., 55 F.3d 269, 277 (7th Cir. 1995).
But see, e.g., Leonard v. Terminex Intern. Co. 854 So. 2d 529, 538 (Ala. 2002) (noting that
class action waivers when combined with limitation of damages clauses in arbitration
agreements are unconscionable because they do not provide a "meaningful remedy" to
plaintiffs); State v. Berger, 567 S.E.2d 265, 278 (holding contract provisions limiting class
action rights unconscionable); Powertel v. Bexley 743 So. 2d 570, 576 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1999).
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of consumers out of individually small sums of money."n Several
states have adhered to California's approach of finding class action
waivers unconscionable when the party with superior bargaining power
is insulated from liability.7 2 Now that the Supreme Court has weighed
in on the issue in AT&T v. Concepcion, it is unclear how these
arbitration agreements containing class action waivers will affect
consumers in the long run.
III. AT&T v. CONCEPCIONAND FUTURE APPLICATION

A.

AT&T v. Concepcion
1. General Overview

In AT&T v. Concepcion, the Supreme Court found that the FAA
preempted the Discover Bank rule. 73 In this case, the Concepcions
purchased mobile cellular service from AT&T based on an
advertisement for free cell phones.74 At the time of purchase, the
Concepcions signed an arbitration agreement that required claims to be
brought in their individual capacity and not as a plaintiff or class
member in any purported class or proceeding.75 Though AT&T
provided the phones for free, they charged the Concepcions $30.22 in
sales tax based on the phones' retail value.76 Upset with the $30.22
charge, the Concepcions filed a lawsuit in United States District. Court
71. See Discover Bank, 36 Cal. 4th at 161 ("Class action and arbitration waivers are
not, in the abstract, exculpatory clauses. But because ... damages in consumer cases are
often small and because company which wrongfully exacts a dollar from each of millions of
customers will reap a handsome profit the class action is often the only effective way to halt
and redress such exploitation. Moreover, such class action or arbitration waivers are
indisputably one-sided. Although styled as a mutual prohibition on representative or class
actions, it is difficult to envision the circumstances under which the provision might
negatively impact Discover [Bank], because credit card companies typically do not sue their
customers in class action lawsuits. Such one-sided, exculpatory contracts in a contract of
adhesion, at least to the extent they operate to insulate a party from liability that otherwise
would be imposed under California law, are generally unconscionable."); AT&T Mobility
LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1742 (2011).
72. Sussman, supra note 54, at 509.
73. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1742; Discover Bank, 36 Cal. 4th at 16 (holding that
class action waivers in contracts of adhesion are unconscionable when they operate to shield
a party from liability that would normally be imposed under state law).
74. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1744.
75. Id. at 1742.
76. Id. at 1744.
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for Southern California, which was consolidated with a putative class
action alleging that AT&T had engaged in false advertising.77 AT&T
subsequently moved to compel arbitration under section 4 of the FAA."
However, the California Federal District Court found that the
Concepcions were entitled to join in a class action claim, despite the
binding arbitration agreement in their contract. 79 Based on the Discover
Bank rule,80 the District Court determined that the arbitration provision
was unconscionable because AT&T had not shown that bilateral
arbitration adequately substituted for the deterrent effects 8' of class
actions. 82 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision,
holding that the provision was unconscionable under California law and
not preempted by the FAA. 83 The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari to determine "whether the FAA prohibits states from
conditioning enforceability of certain arbitration agreements on the
availability of class-wide arbitration procedures." 84
2. The 5-to-4 Supreme Court Decision85
Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court, 86 which held
that California's DiscoverBank rule87 is preempted by the FAA because
it "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full

77. Id. at 1745.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See Discover Bank v. Super. Ct., 36 Cal. 4th 148, 161 (Cal. 2005).
81. See generally Jason Sherman, Injury or Deterrence: The End of Class action
Litigation and Its Benefit to Consumers, 1 HARV. Bus. L. REv. ONuNE 50 (2011),
http://www.hblr.org/?p=978 (suggesting that deterring businesses from wrong-doing may be
the primary benefit of class actions, since consumers individually benefit more from the
one-on-one non-aggregated arbitration).
82. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1742.
83. Id; see also 9 U.S.C. § 2 ("[A]n agreement in writing to submit to arbitration ...
shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract.").
84. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1744.
85. The opinion of the Court was delivered by Justice Scalia, in which Roberts,
Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito joined. Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Breyer filed a
dissenting opinion in which Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined. Id. at 1740.
86. Id.
87. See id. at 1742 (noting that under the Discover Bank rule, class action waivers
designed to insulate parties with superior bargaining power from liability were
unconscionable in consumer contracts of adhesion).
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purposes and objectives of Congress." 88 Accordingly, when a state law
outright prohibits the arbitration of a particular type of claim, the FAA
displaces the conflicting rule. 89 The Court argued that requiring the
availability of class wide arbitration would interfere with the
fundamental attributes of arbitration and create a scheme inconsistent
with the FAA. 90 Furthermore, the Court opined that "arbitration is
poorly suited to the higher stakes of class wide litigation as it deprives
the defendant the opportunity to appeal a certificate decision on an
interlocutory basis and to appeal from a final judgment." 91
Instead of relying on the principle of preemption, the concurring
opinion 9 2 reached the same result as the majority based on the text of
the FAA.93 According to Justice Thomas, the text of the FAA demands
that an agreement to arbitrate be enforced unless a party successfully
contests the formation of the arbitration agreement. 94 Therefore, he
wrote that the decision of the Ninth Circuit should be reversed not due
to preemption; but instead, because the Concepcions failed to fully
develop the challenge to the class action waiver based on defects in the
making of the agreement. 95
On the other hand, the dissent 96 argued that the Discover Bank
rule is consistent with the FAA's objective to place agreements to
litigate and arbitrate on the same footing.9 7 Not only does the rule apply
equally to class action litigation waivers in contracts without arbitration
agreements as it does to class arbitration waivers, 98 it also falls squarely
within the scope of the Act's exception permitting courts to refuse to
enforce arbitration agreements on grounds that exist "for the revocation
of any contract." 99 The dissent further suggests that the opinion of the
88. See id at 1753 (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
89. Id. at 1744.
90. AT&T v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 1750 (2011).
91. Id. at 1751-52.
92. See id at 1740 (Thomas, J., concurring).
93. Id. at 1753; see, e.g., Kamens & Taylor, supra note 64.
94. Id at 1753 (citing 9 U.S.C. §§ 2, 4 (2006)).
95. See id. at 1753-54 (noting that although he adheres to his views on the objectives of
preemption, the test outlined by the majority in this case leads to the same outcome as his
textual interpretation).
96. See id. at 1756 (5-4 decision) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
97. Kamens & Taylor, supra note 64.
98. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1757 (citing Discover Bank v. Super. Ct., 36 Cal. 4th
148, 165-66 (2005)).
99. Id. at 1757 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006)).
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Court is not supported by the Court's precedent,'00 and does not embody
the federalist ideal of respecting the legitimacy of a State's action in an
individual case. 01
3. Evaluating the Opinion
The decision outlined in AT&T v. Concepcion is perhaps one of
the more ideological 5-to-4 decisions that the Court has had in the last
year or two, with the irony being that the majority and minority
"reversed their usual roles and usual rhetoric."' 02 For example, the
dissent written by Justice Breyer suggests that federalism requires the
Court to defer to the state rule,103 which is usually the position of the
conservative majority.104 Given that this majority is normally extremely
respectful of federalism and its values, this decision is likely the
reflection of the majority's extreme distaste for class actions.' 05
Another interesting point in this decision is the suggestion by
the Court that this interpretation was required in order to "accomplish
and execute the full purposes and objectives of Congress."l 06 The idea
that the FAA passed in the 1925 legislature was meant to cover
arbitration agreements between businesses and consumers is unlikely
since at that time consumers and businesses did not enter into arbitration
agreements with one another in the United States. 107 It is, therefore,
argued that the legislative intent of the FAA is being misused in "order
to insulate corporations from liability for wrongdoing."'0 8
100. See id. at 1761 (noting that the FAA has not generally been used to strike down
state statutes that place arbitration on a similar footing as judicial and administrative
proceedings).
101. Id. at 1762 (arguing that the principles of federalism supports upholding
California's law).
102. Kamens & Taylor, supra note 64 (quoting Professor John C. Coffee Jr., who
teaches at the Columbia Law School).
103. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1762.
104. Kamens & Taylor, supra note 64 (citing comments from Professor John C. Coffee
Jr., who teaches at the Columbia Law School).
105. Id.
106. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1756 (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67
(1941)).
107. See BRUNET ET AL., supra note 23, at 127; Jessie. K. Kamens, Supreme Court:
Leahy Concerned Supreme Court Rulings Have Tilted Too Much Toward Corporations,
CORP. L. DAILY (BNA), June 30, 2011 (noting comments from Senator Al Franken (DMinn.) that suggest the FAA was intended to apply only in contract between businesses).
108. Kamens, supra note 107 (quoting Professor Melissa Hart, associate professor at the
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As such, Concepcion was indeed a significant change in the law
on arbitration.1 09 Prior to this ruling, California precedent uniformly
held that arbitration provisions "purporting to waive class action rights
were invalid" on the basis on unconscionability.1 10 However, some
believe that the battles over class action waivers are far from over."'
B.

PotentialImpact of Concepcion on Class Action Waivers in
MandatoryArbitrationAgreements: Who Wins and Who Loses?

Some argue that that mandatory arbitration is an area in which
consumers have gotten the "short end of the stick," as mandatory
arbitration tends to favor businesses and not the consumer.1 12 Since
many businesses now believe that class action waivers in mandatory
arbitration agreements will generally be upheld in court challenges,1 13
opponents of the decision argue that the Supreme Court ruling will
make it harder for people instituting consumer claims that stem from
corporate wrongdoing to join together to obtain their rightful
compensation. 114
However, predictions that all business will begin using
mandatory arbitration agreements to avoid class actions are
unsupported.' 15 In addition, others feel that Concepcion is not "a
victory for businesses over consumers, but rather a reaffirmation that
arbitration is the preferred method for resolving disputes under our legal

University of Colorado School of Law).
109. Jacquelyn M. Lindsey et al., Arbitration:Former Employee Must Arbitrate Bias
Claims Against Law Firm Despite Flaws in Agreement, CORP. L. DAILY (BNA), Aug. 4,
2011 (noting that under California law, a waiver of rights in contracts of adhesion could be
considered unconscionable).
110. R. Christian Bruce, Judge Upholds Bank's Decision to Wait for U.S. Supreme
Court'sArbitration Ruling, 96 BANKING REP. (BNA), No. 1208, June 28, 2011.
111. R. Christian Bruce, Is there Wiggle Room on Arbitration?ABA Meeting Maps Next
Likely Cases. BANKING DAILY (BNA), Aug. 9, 2011 (noting that Concepcion was "too broad
and was fought largely in the abstract") [hereinafter Bruce, Wiggle Room].
112. R. Christian Bruce, Recent Court Actions Shed More Light on Use of Class
Waivers in Arbitration, 94 BANKING REP. (BNA) No. 1096, June 1, 2010 [hereinafter
Bruce, CourtActions].
113. Bruce, Wiggle Room, supra note 111.
114. Kamens & Taylor, supra note 64 (quoting Deepak Gupta, a staff attorney at Public
Citizen Litigation Group in Washington, D.C.).
115. See Drahozal & Rutledge, Arbitration & Consumer supra note 63, at 5 (noting that
the significance of other factors in explaining the use of arbitration clauses provides a limit
on the increase of arbitration clause post Concepcion).
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system."ll 6 For instance, the informality, efficiency, cost-effectiveness,
and procedural flexibility" 7 of bilateral arbitration may make it a "better
alternative for resolving disputes"' 18 for both consumer and
businesses.11 9 Furthermore, business may be relieved by this ruling
since class actions exert enormous pressure on banks to settle because
of the risk of litigating the case.120
While Scalia's opinion suggests that states cannot require
procedures that are inconsistent with the FAA,121 it is unlikely that this
case will be the last word on class action waivers in mandatory
arbitration agreements.122 For one, the Supreme Court has historically
only enforced arbitration agreements so long as parties were able to
vindicate their rights,123 and thus this decision would not likely permit
unfair arbitration agreements that would saddle consumers with
exorbitant fees or limit their ability to initiate arbitration.124 In addition,
Concepcion does not directly address the relationship between the FAA
and rights under other federal statutes, and thus it is likely that this will
be the basis for the next case the Supreme Court takes on this issue. 125
In Green Tree Financial Corporation-Alabama v. Randolph, Green

Tree moved to compel arbitration pursuant to a contract between the
parties, but the plaintiff sought to invalidate the arbitration provision on
the ground that the "arbitration agreement's silence with respect to costs
and fees creates a risk that she will be required to bear prohibitive
arbitration costs if she pursues her claims in an arbitral forum, and
116. Davidson, supranote 3.
117. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1751 (2011) (discussing
the benefits of bilateral arbitration).
118. See Kamens & Taylor, supra note 64 (noting comments from Alan Kaplinsky, a
partner at Ballard Spahr, L.L.P., suggesting that bilateral arbitration is an adequate forum for
dispute resolution).
119. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1762; see also Kamens & Taylor, supra note 64 (quoting
Alan Kaplinsky, a partner at Ballard Spahr, L.L.P.).
120. Bruce, Court Actions, supra note 112.
121. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1757 (noting that the FAA preempts state laws that
prevents the execution of the purposes and objectives of the Act).
122. See generally Bruce, Wiggle Room, supra note 111 (discussing what types of cases
may potentially revisit this issue).
123. Id. (quoting Attorney F. Paul Bland ofthe Public Justice law firm).
124. Davidson, supra note 3. But see Paul H. Haagan, New Wineskins for New Wine:
The Need To Encourage Fairness in Mandatory Arbitration, 40 ARIz. L. REV. 1039, 1068
(1998) (suggesting that the burden of demonstrating that the arbitration is inadequate to
vindicate one's rights is almost impossible to meet).
125. Bruce, Wiggle Room, supra note 111 (quoting Attorney Alan S. Kaplinsky, a
partner at Ballard Spahr, L.L.P.).
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thereby forces her to forgo any claims she may have against" Green
Tree. 126 Though the Supreme Court ruled that the plaintiffs concern
about the expense of arbitrating was "too speculative to justify the
invalidation of an arbitration," the Court stated that "[i]t may well be
that the existence of large arbitration costs could preclude a litigant ...
from effectively vindicating her federal statutory rights in the arbitral
forum." 1 27 The Second Circuit applied Green Tree to invalidate a class
action waiver in an arbitration agreement in In re American Express
Merchants' Litigation and concluded that "the cost of plaintiffs'
individually arbitrating their dispute with Amex would be prohibitive,
effectively depriving plaintiffs of the statutory protections of the
antitrust laws."1 28 Therefore, the Second Circuit refused to enforce the
class action waiver since the class action was the plaintiffs' "only
economically feasible means for enforcing their statutory rights."l 29
Post-Concepcion,courts in the Second Circuit have used a case-by-case
analysis to determine the enforceability of a class action waiver based
on the "totality of the circumstances including, but not limited to, the
fairness of the provisions, the cost to an individual plaintiff of
vindicating the claim when compared to the plaintiffs potential
recovery, the ability to recover attorneys' fees and other costs and thus
obtain legal representation to prosecute the underlying claim."1 30 In
Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., a Second Circuit District Court

held that a class action waiver would prevent the plaintiff from
vindicating federal statutory rights pursuant to Title VII, since a plaintiff
could only bring such a "pattern or practice" discrimination claim in a
collective action. 31 However, in another post-Concepcion case, the
United States District Court for Northern California noted that if "Green
Tree has any continuing applicability, it must be confined to
circumstances in which a plaintiff argues that costs specific to the
126. Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000).
127. Id. at 90-9 1.
128. In re American Express Merchs.' Litig., 634 F.3d 187, 197-99 (2d Cir. 2011).
129. See id at 198; In re American Express Merchs.' Litig., No. 06-1871-CV, 2012 U.S.
App. LEXIS 1871, at *40-42 (2d. Cir. Feb. 1, 2012) (noting that Concepcion does not
change the necessity of a case-by-case vindication of rights analysis for certain statutory
claims).
130. Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP, No. 10 Civ. 3332, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5024,
at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2012).
131. Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., No. 10 Civ. 6950, 2011 WL 2671813 at *25 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2011).
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arbitration process, such as filing fees and arbitrator's fees, prevent her
from vindicating her claims." 32
Even still, mandatory arbitration agreements may be deemed
invalid based on the text of the FAA. The FAA provides that arbitration
clauses shall be "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable save upon such
grounds as exists at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract,"
such as fraud, duress, or contract formation issues.1 33 In NAACP of
Camden County East v. Foulke Management, the state court relied on

contract formation doctrines to invalidate an arbitration agreement that
lacked mutual assent to the arbitration provisions.' 34 Though several
federal courts have refused to distinguish and limit the scope of
Concepcion,'3 5 other courts' efforts to limit Concepcion's reach 36
indicate that there may still be more to come.137
IV. THE ROLE OF THE CFPB

The balance between efficiency and economy and the need to
protect vulnerable consumers is delicate. This is particularly true in the
consumer context where the coexistence of mandatory arbitration
clauses and class action waivers cause problems.' 38 In this context,
these clauses tend to be used effectively as an exculpatory measure.'3
This is where the CFPB, established in response to the United States'
financial crisis,140 could play a vital role:
132. Kaltwasser v. AT&T Mobility LLC, No. 07-00411, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
106783, at *20 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2011).
133. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
134. NAACP of Camden Cnty. East v. Foulke Mgmt. Corp., 421 N.J. Super. Ct. 404,
428-429 (App. Div. 2011).
135. See Arbitration:No Way Around Concepcionfor Plaintiffs in Case Against AT&T,
Eleventh Circuit Rules, 97 BANKING REP. (BNA), Aug. 23, 2011 (discussing Cruz v.
Cingular Wireless LLC, 648 F.3d 1205 (11th Cir. 2011); R. Christian Bruce, FederalJudge
Says Class Waiver Valid Even IfLoans Violate Pennsylvania Law, BANKING DAILY (BNA),
Aug. 16, 2011 (discussing Alfeche v. Cash Am. Int'l, Inc., No. 09-0953, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 90085 (E.D. Pa., Aug. 12, 2011)).
136. See generally NAACP, 421 N.J. Super. Ct. at 428-429 (relying on contract
formation doctrines to invalidate the arbitration agreement); Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs
& Co., No. 10 Civ. 6950, 2011 WL 2671813 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2011) (relying on the
vindication of statutory rights principle to allow the class action to proceed).
137. Bruce, Wiggle Room, supra note 111 (quoting Attorney Alan S. Kaplinsky, a
partner at Ballard Spahr, L.L.P.).
138. Rice, supra note 47, at 253.
139. Id.
140. Building the CFPB,supra note 8, at 8-9.
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Beginning in 2007, the United States faced the most
severe financial crisis since the Great Depression.
Millions of Americans saw their home values drop, their
savings shrink, their jobs eliminated, and their small
businesses lose financing. Credit dried up, and countless
consumer loans - many improperly made to begin with
- went into default. 14 1
Concern about the unfair, deceptive, and abusive financial
practices that led to this financial crisis prompted the enactment of
Dodd-Frank. 142 Congress created the CFPB through Dodd-Frank. One
provision of Dodd-Frank requires the CFPB to study and provide a
report to Congress concerning the use of mandatory pre-dispute
arbitration agreements in the limited context of contracts for consumer
financial products or services. 14 3 Based on the results of this study, the
CFPB may prohibit or impose conditions on the use of mandatory predispute arbitration agreements in contracts for consumer financial
products or services. 144 Though a CFPB rule prohibiting class action
waivers would probably not be applicable in the phone purchase
contract at issue in the Concepcion case, 14 5 the CFPB does have specific
legislative authority to promulgate a rule that could limit class action
waivers in contracts for consumer financial products or services which
could in turn override the Concepcion case in the consumer financial
products or services area. 146 However, it is important to note that the
CFPB itself "is subject to substantial oversight and limitations on its
activities and authorities." 147 Not only are the CFPB's activities subject
to judicial review, but CFPB's rules can also be overruled by a council
made up of other federal financial regulatory agencies. 148
Therefore, how should the CFPB respond to Concepcion as it
141. Id. at 8.
142. E.g., id; see also Hanft, supranote 2, at 2788.
143. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 5491, 5518 (Supp. IV 2010).
144. See id.§ 5518.
145. Id (noting that the CFPB's authority is limited to the consumer financial products,
and it may not impose conditions on voluntary post-dispute consumer arbitration
agreements).
146. See id. (giving the CFPB the authority to restrict or prohibit pre-dispute mandatory
arbitration clauses in the contracts for consumer financial products or services).
147. Building the CFPB,supra note 8, at 32.

148. Id.
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relates to class action waivers in mandatory pre-dispute arbitration
agreements in connection with consumer financial products or services?
Many can agree that the outright elimination of arbitration in consumer
contracts is not the most appropriate response. 149 Some suggest that
instead the CFPB should focus on establishing an arbitration process
that is fair for the consumer as well as the company. 50 However, while
many agree that class action waivers are particularly advantageous for
businesses,15 1 what is best for the consumer may be less obvious.152
The CFPB should resist the temptation to over regulate the class
action waiver process in mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements.
Though the courts have been split for years on this issue,153 and an array
of legislative approaches are possible, Congress has not been eager to
regulate or prohibit such agreements.154 One possible explanation is the
concern that the over-regulation of mandatory arbitration would "return
us to the era of 'judicial hostility toward arbitration agreements' that the
FAA sought to end."' 55 In addition, over regulation could limit
consumer access to financial services.1 56 An empirical study on the use
of arbitration clauses in credit card agreements, found that credit card
"issuers are more likely to use arbitration clauses when they (1)
specialize in making credit card loans; (2) make riskier credit card
loans; and (3) have a larger credit card portfolio." 57 This suggests that
increased regulation of consumer arbitration could encourage credit card
issuers to reduce their volume of outstanding credit card loans or avoid
lending to high-risk consumers,15 8 which could have a negative impact
on the availability of credit for lower-income borrowers.
149. Rice, supranote 47, at 253.
150. Davidson, supra note 3.
151. Bruce, Court Actions, supra note 112.
152. See supra Part II.B.3. ("Class actions also present numerous disadvantages for the
consumer including: possible delay in obtaining individual relief; greater litigation expenses
in the event of an unsuccessful class action; and an increased likelihood that the plaintiffs
choice of forum will not be upheld.").
153. Kamens & Taylor, supra note 64 (quoting Alan Kaplinsky, a partner at Ballard
Spahr, L.L.P.).
154. BRUNET ET AL., supra note 23, at 179.
155. See Drahozal & Rutledge, Contract,supra note 21, at 1168 (noting the effects of
the courts holding class action waivers unconscionable).
156. See Drahozal & Rutledge, Arbitration & Consumer supra note 63, at 4-5 (noting
that the increased regulation of arbitration clauses could reduce the supply of credit to
consumers, particularly high-risk borrowers).
157. Id.
158. Id
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Therefore, the CFPB's comprehensive study of class action
waivers in pre-dispute mandatory arbitration agreements should include
an analysis of data related to: (1) consumer perceptions; (2) outcome
comparisons; and (3) corporate behavior. Since the CFPB has been
charged with responding to the needs of consumers,1 59 any study on this
issue should reflect consumer perceptions of their experience in both
bilateral and class arbitration proceedings. This information would not
only assist the CFPB in understanding the advantages and disadvantages
of mandatory arbitration from the consumer perspective, but also help to
guide the CFPB's future arbitration policy.' 60 The study should also
include an analysis of consumer outcomes. Since the courts have been
split for years on the issue of class action waivers in mandatory
arbitration agreements,161 the CFPB could conduct a retrospective study
and comparison of consumer outcomes in jurisdictions where class
action waivers were allowed versus those jurisdictions that banned such
waiver provisions. In particular, it would be important to compare not
only the awards and associated costs, but to also track whether
consumers continued to proceed with pursuing their claims in
arbitration when the class action was not available to them or instead
opted to drop their claims altogether. Such a study would help the
CFPB determine whether class action waivers have prevented
consumers from effectively vindicating their rights. Perhaps the most
important aspect of this study' 62 would include a comparison and
analysis of data on corporate behavior in jurisdictions with competing
views on these class action waiver provisions. If class actions are
indeed an effective deterrent from corporate wrongdoing, you would
expect to see less corporate abuse in jurisdictions that banned class
159. See 12 U.S.C. § 5518 (Supp. IV 2010) ("The Bureau, by regulation, may prohibit
or impose conditions or limitations on the use of an agreement between a covered person
and a consumer for a consumer financial product or service providing for arbitration of any
future dispute between the parties, if the Bureau finds that such a prohibition or imposition
of conditions or limitations is in the public interest and for the protection of consumers. The
findings in such rule shall be consistent with the study conducted under subsection (a).").
160. Cf Stephen Meili, Collective Justice or PersonalGain?: An EmpiricalAnalysis of
Consumer Class Action Lawyers and Named Plaintiffs, 44 AKRON L. REv. 67, 75-76 (2011)
(discussing how a study of consumer perceptions in class actions could inform class action
policy decisions).
161. Kamens & Taylor, supra note 64 (quoting Alan Kaplinsky, a partner at Ballard
Spahr, L.L.P.).
162. See Sachs-Michaels, supra note 51, at 671 (noting that class actions may be a
productive deterrent from corporate wrongdoing).
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action waivers than in similarly situated jurisdictions that allowed class
action waiver provisions.163 This information could prove to be
instrumental in determining the impact of class actions on deterrence
from corporate wrongdoing. By formulating a study that includes
consumer perceptions, consumer outcomes, and an analysis of corporate
behavior the CFPB would gain additional insight on ways to protect the
consumerl 64 without over-regulating an arbitration process that benefits
all parties.' 65
However, such a study may take years.166 Therefore, it is
important to consider what the CFPB should be doing now to protect
consumers who may be adversely affected by the ruling. One
suggestion is that the CFPB should simply ban class action waivers in
mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements.167 Yet it is unlikely that
the CFPB could even take such an action as an interim measure, since
Dodd-Frank specifically requires a study of this issue prior to any
prohibition or restriction on mandatory pre-dispute arbitration
agreements.168 Furthermore, even if permitted under the Act, the
current political climate may prevent the CFPB from taking such a
measure in the absence of empirical data.' 69
It is this Note's contention that the most significant benefit of
class actions is deterrence of corporate wrongdoing.170 With the
Concepcion ruling in place and the unlikelihood of additional legislative
intervention, there is some concern that businesses may not be held
163. Cf Drahozal & Rutledge, Arbitration & Consumer supra note 63, at 4 (finding that
credit card issuers were less likely to use arbitration clauses in states where class action
waivers were deemed unenforceable).
164. Cf Meili, supra note 160, at 75-76 (2011) ("[Sltudy's findings suggest at least one
reform to improve the class action process: creating a standardized formula for
compensating named plaintiffs for the time and money they spend fulfilling that role ....
Calculating those awards according to a standardized formula, such as a percentage of the
total payout to class members, would provide the named plaintiff with a better idea of what
to expect should she be successful.").
165.

BRUNET ET AL., supra note 23, at 149.

166. See Meili, supra note 160, at 78 (noting that interviews for this study began in 2008
and continued through 2009).
167. See Davidson, supra note 3 (citing comments from Deepak Gupta, a Public Citizen
lawyer, that suggests that the CFPB has the power to trump the Supreme Court decision).
168. See 12 U.S.C. § 5518 (Supp. IV 2010).
169. See Kamens, supra note 107 (citing comments from Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.)
that suggests that it will be difficult to overturn the Supreme Court's decision due to the
current make-up of the House and Senate).
170. Sachs-Michaels, supra note 51, at 671; see Meili, supra note 160, at 76 (asserting
that class actions are the best way to stop widespread corporate abuse) .
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accountable.17 1 An alternative approach to the prohibition of class
action waivers in mandatory arbitration agreements could come through
the utilization of the CFPB's consumer complaint and inquiry system.
The CFPB has already planned to implement a phased rollout of
complaints and consumers' inquiries in order to identify areas of
concern and aid in its supervision and other responsibilities.172
However, the CFPB could begin immediately1 73 to collect information
from consumers via an integrated web and phone system for small
claims that were forced into mandatory bilateral arbitration. In turn, the
CFPB could utilize the information obtained from its consumer
complaint and inquiry system to conduct its own investigations of these
companies. There is some skepticism about whether such an approach
would be an effective deterrent. One article suggests that "corporate
officers and directors agonize less over the Securities Exchange
Commission than over potential securities fraud class actions;
pharmaceutical companies worry less about the Federal Drug
Administration's post-approval monitoring than about products liability
class actions; and the Federal Trade Commission is less threatening to
companies apt to ignore fair credit reporting requirements than the class
action bar."1 7 4 However, unlike these and other federal agencies, the
CFPB has the unprecedented power'7 5 to study, monitor, and to
promulgate rules that could significantly influence pre-dispute
mandatory arbitration clauses.176 Therefore, if the consumer complaint
and inquiry system failed to be an effective tool for deterrence, the
CFPB, based on these findings, could impose restrictions that would
greatly affect businesses' ability to enter into such agreements with
consumers. 177 This fear of increased regulation and restriction
combined with the threat of investigations would also likely have some

171. See Kamens, supra note 107.
172. Building the CFPB, supra note 8, at 18.
173. Though the CFPB says that it will phase in different areas of consumer complaints,
it gives no timeline for how soon they will begin to address complaints regarding mandatory
arbitration agreements. Id.
174. Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, CAFA's Impact on Litigation as a Public Good, 29
CARDOZo L. REv. 2517, 2517-18 (2008).
175. See Jim Hawkins, The Federal Government in the Fringe Economy, 15 CHAP. L.
REv. 23, 24 (2011) (discussing how the CFPB could impact fringe banking transactions).
176. 12 U.S.C. § 5518 (Supp. IV 2010).
177. See id (discussing the CFPB's authority).
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deterrent effect of corporate wrongdoing. 7 8
One of the principal roles of consumer protection regulation is
to make it easy for consumers to see what they are getting and to
compare one product with another. For instance, consumers might
demand products without class action waivers if it were easy to figure
out if such waivers are included in the contract and the consequences of
such inclusion. It is, therefore, important that the CFPB also focus on
consumer education.179 In doing so, the CFPB could follow the lead of
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996
(HIPAA).' 8 ' This would include the CFPB's development of a concise
document that defines mandatory arbitration and class action waivers
and identifies the potential benefits and risks associated with these
provisions. All businesses that choose to employ such agreements
would be required to give a copy of this document to consumers and
have them acknowledge their receipt of this information prior to
entering any mandatory arbitration agreement.18 1 Finally, consistent
with Dodd-Frank's mandate, the CFPB should also serve as resource for
consumers who are looking to better understand their rights as they
relate to mandatory arbitration by providing access to tools and
information that can help consumers make informed decisions.' 82 The
outlined suggestions could bring the CFPB closer to its mission of
making "markets for consumer financial products and services work for
Americans"' 83 without disturbing the Supreme Court decision or overregulating a process that has potential benefits to all parties.
178. Since "the main effect of this rulemaking power will be that existing laws will be
more stringently enforced," this Note suggests that corporate entities may choose to interact
with consumers fairly versus risk increased oversight and enforcement. See Hawkins, supra
note 175, at 24.
179. Building the CFPB, supra note 8, at 18-19 (suggesting that informed consumers
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V. CONCLUSION

The concern that consumers could be bartering away substantial
rights in pre-dispute mandatory arbitration agreements is not unfounded.
This is especially true when such agreements erode the bargaining
power of the weaker party.184 Concepcion has undoubtedly presented
consumers with an additional limitation on its power to bargain with
businesses. However, government regulation is not always the answer.
This Note provides the CFPB with four alternative ways to address
consumers' needs: (1) conducting studies of class action waivers in
mandatory arbitration agreements; (2) collecting data and investigating
potential corporate wrongdoing; (3) developing and requiring
businesses to distribute a consumer education document related to such
agreements and waivers; and (4) serving as resource to consumers who
are looking to better understand class action waivers in the context of
mandatory arbitration agreements. By employing these suggestions, the
CFPB may be armed with the tools it needs to ensure that consumer
rights are protected without having too heavy a hand.
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184. Sevilla, supra note 26, at 333.
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